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Introduction 
The European Pressurised water Reactor or EPR
1
 was to have been the demonstration of a new 
generation of nuclear reactors, so-called Generation III+, first talked about in the late 1990s. The 
difference between ‗III+‘  and the earlier ‗III‘ designs is that III+ designs are said to rely more on 
‗passive‘ rather than ‗engineered‘ systems.2  
The rationale for the Generation III+ plants was that they would be an evolution of existing designs 
but would be designed from the start with the lessons from the Three Mile Island and Chernobyl 
accidents fully incorporated. They would rely more on natural processes rather than engineered 
systems for their safety – so-called passive safety. As well as being safer, they would also be more 
‗buildable‘, cheaper to build and operate, and easier to decommission. In short, they would address 
the issues that had led to ordering of earlier designs to a near halt from about 1990 onwards. 
The Olkiluoto order, placed in 2003, should have been on-line in 2009 and should have been a 
demonstration of the qualities of Generation III+ designs in general and the EPR in particular. 
However, by 2010, the EPR appeared to be in crisis. The two orders on which significant construction 
work had been completed had gone seriously wrong, obtaining safety approval from regulators in 
Europe and the USA was proving far more difficult than had been expected, estimated construction 
costs had increased by a factor of at least four in the past decade and the EPR had failed to win orders 
in bids for tender for nuclear capacity. Relations between the two state-controlled French companies 
at the heart of the development of the EPR, Areva, the vendor and Electricité de France (EDF), the 
utility appeared at breaking point. EDF was reportedly contemplating designing two new reactors in 
competition with those offered by Areva.
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In this report, we examine the roots of the design, existing and potential orders for the reactor, 
experience with construction of the EPR, issues arising from the safety assessment of the design, and 
economic issues. We examine the report by the Roussely Commission, a report commissioned by the 
French government and headed by a former Chief Executive of the French utility, Electricité de 
France (EDF), and its implications for the EPR. 
The roots of the EPR design 
In 1989, Siemens, the main German nuclear vendor and Framatome, the French nuclear vendor 
formed a joint venture company, Nuclear Power International (NPI) to design a new Pressurised 
Water Reactor (PWR). Siemens and Framatome had both been licensees of Westinghouse for their 
PWR technology. Design work was partly funded by German utilities and Electricité de France. This 
design would be based on Siemens‘ and Framatome's most recent PWR designs, the ‗Konvoi‘ design 
and the N4 respectively. By 1992, NPI was claiming that the conceptual design of the EPR was nearly 
complete,
4
 although the conceptual design was not actually completed until 1994. The EPR would 
have a thermal output of 4250MW giving an electrical output of about 1450MW. The containment 
was drawn mainly from the N4 design, while instrumentation was expected to be drawn from the 
Konvoi. A particular feature of the design was the inclusion of a ‗core catcher‘ so that in the event of 
a core melt, the core would be retained within the containment. There was some uncertainty about 
what type of external hazards would be guarded against, with the French requiring protection only 
against a light aircraft, such as a Cessna, while the Germans required a military jet, like a Phantom. 
In March 1995, the basic design phase was started with the expectation that EDF would order the first 
unit before 2000 and have it in service by 2006. However, there was then already so much nuclear 
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capacity in France that EDF had more than enough nuclear power capacity to meet base-load. This 
meant that ‗series‘ ordering, that is ordering at a predictable rate of several units per year, would not 
be needed before 2005.
5
 The French programme had always been premised on an assumption that a 
nuclear power programme only made sense if series ordering was expected. The issue of aircraft 
protection was not fully resolved but the French containment was approved by both the German and 
French regulators. By November 1995, there were concerns, especially amongst EDF officials, about 
the cost of the design, then expected to be more than US$2000/kW.
6
 The basic design work was not 
completed on time and in August 1997, after further concern about costs, the output of the plant was 
increased to 1800MW.
7
 
In September 1999, the head of DSIN (the French safety regulatory body later renamed DGSNR), 
Andre-Claude Lacoste, stated he expected to issue an interim safety verdict on the EPR within ‗a few 
weeks to a few months‘ with a final design certification, reported to be equivalent to NRC‘s design 
certification for advanced reactors.
 8
 The output of the reactor had been reduced back down to about 
1500MW. However, by 2003, the final certification had not been issued and Andre-Claude Lacoste, 
the head of the French regulatory body,, stated the process carried out up till then did not correspond 
to US design certification and that to achieve this would take 2-3 years more.
9
 
In August 2000, Framatome and Siemens agreed to a new joint venture formally merging their 
nuclear activities into a new company called Framatome ANP, subsequently renamed Areva NP. 
Framatome would hold 66 per cent of the stock and Siemens the rest.
10
 
Marketing of the EPR 
Continued delays to EDF‘s order led Areva NP to switch to Finland as the focus for its  marketing. In 
May 2002, the Finnish Parliament approved the construction of a fifth nuclear unit in Finland. Three 
designs were short-listed from a list of seven for an order to be placed by the Finnish utility, 
Teollisuuden Voima Oy (TVO). The Finnish safety regulator, STUK, had already stated that it saw no 
difficulties in principle in licensing any of the seven initial candidates.
11
 The three short-listed reactors 
were the EPR, a Russian design and a Boiling Water Reactor design also offered by Areva NP. TVO 
was widely reported to be looking for a ‗turnkey‘ (fixed price) contract. Westinghouse chose not to 
bid overtly on the grounds that a turnkey offer would not be profitable.
12
 However, there were also 
claims by Areva that Westinghouse‘s AP1000 would not have met the requirements on aircraft 
protection because its containment was not strong enough.
13
 The AP1000 does not have a core-catcher 
and the head of STUK, Jukka Laaksonen has stated that on these grounds, the AP1000 would not have 
been acceptable in Finland.
14
   
In December 2003, TVO signed a turnkey deal with Areva NP for a 1600MW EPR at a cost, 
including interest during construction and two fuel charges of €3bn. The Finnish regulator was by 
then in close contact with the French regulator, DGSNR, which was expecting that an order for 
France would be placed in 2004. STUK expected to complete its review of the design within a year of 
the placing of the order. 
By December, STUK and DGSNR had agreed to opt for different approaches so that construction in 
Finland did not have to wait until demonstrations of safety features that were expected to reduce costs 
had been carried out.
15
 In January 2005, STUK approved construction of Olkiluoto 3.
16
 
In September 2004, DGSNR completed its review of the EPR and in October, the French government 
issued design approval for it, claimed to be equivalent to NRC design certification.
17
 In December 
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2004, Areva NP wrote to the US NRC asking it to begin a review of the EPR design for the US 
market.
18
 It expected completion of the review in 2008. 
Approval by the French regulator came just after the opening of a call for tender from China in 
October 2004 and with further delays in ordering in France, Areva NP‘s marketing efforts switched to 
China.  China‘s decision on the tender was delayed several times and it was not until December 2006 
that it was announced that it had been won by Toshiba/Westinghouse‘s offer of four AP1000s. One of 
the factors behind Areva NP‘s failure to win the initial tender was reported to be its reluctance to 
transfer the technology as quickly and as fully as the Chinese wanted.
19
 China wanted quickly to be in 
a position to be able to build reactors of the design it chose without any input from the original vendor 
and in 2010, it was planning to start placing orders for plants of the AP1000 design without major 
involvement from Westinghouse.
20
 There were reports that Areva NP had failed to match 
Westinghouse‘s offer to ‗sell the Chinese the blueprints.‘21 However, reportedly in the interests of 
relations with France, China subsequently ordered two EPRs in November 2007 for the Taishan site 
in a deal reportedly worth €8bn. It is not clear what the terms of the contract were or what it covered 
so it is difficult to compare this deal with others. EDF took a 30 per cent stake in the company, 
Guangdong Nuclear Power Company (GNPC), building the reactors. 
In the meantime, EDF finally ordered its first EPR to be built at its Flamanville site in 2005. At that 
time, EDF expected the reactor to cost €3.3bn, although the reactor would produce 1700MW, 100MW 
more than the Olkiluoto order. Construction of the reactor (first structural concrete) did not start until 
December 2007 and it was expected to take five years to build, a year more than Olkiluoto. Unlike 
Olkiluoto where Areva NP carried out the architect engineering, EDF itself carried out the architect 
engineering, as it has done with the 58 previous reactors it had bought from Framatome. 
The next tender was for South Africa launched in January 2008 calling for 3200-3600MW of new 
capacity from Areva NP and Toshiba Westinghouse. The tender was in two parts: the first with 
specific proposals for the 3200-3600MW of capacity and the second the development of a 20,000MW 
nuclear fleet to be in place by 2025.. The first part of the bid would require either two EPRs of 
1600MW or three AP1000s each about 1200MW.
22
 It was reported that the bids were in the order 
US$6000/kW
23
 and in November 2008, it was reported that Areva had won the contest, although the 
scale of  20,000MW programme was to be scaled back.
24
 However, in December 2008, Eskom 
cancelled the tender citing ‗the magnitude of the investment.‘25 
In February 2009, Areva NP bid for two reactors to be constructed in Ontario.
26
 Other bidders were 
Toshiba-Westinghouse (AP1000) and the Canadian vendor, AECL offering a new Candu design.
27
 
The commissioning body was Infrastructure Ontario a state-owned agency. In June 2009, the Ontario 
government suspended the tender citing concerns about pricing. It was reported that Areva NP‘s bid 
for one EPR was US$21bn. This was denied by Areva NP but they did not reveal the actual figure.
28
 
In February 2009, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) began the assessment of bids for 5000MW of new 
nuclear capacity. In addition to a bid from Areva NP for three EPRs, it was reported that there were 
bids from General Electric-Hitachi and Toshiba/Westinghouse.
29
 The EPR bid initially involved 
Areva NP, GDF Suez, Bechtel and Total. Subsequently, at the request of the French government, EDF 
was persuaded to join the EPR bid. In July, three bids were selected for assessment including a bid 
from GE-Hitachi for a boiling water reactor (BWR) and one from a Korean group offering its 
Pressurised Water Reactor (PWR), the APR-1400.
30
 In December 2009, it was announced that the 
tender had been awarded to the Korean consortium for four APR-1400 units at a price of US$20bn. 
According to Korean media reports, the Korean bid was almost 30 per cent lower per kW than the 
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EPR bid, while the GE Hitachi offer was said to be higher than the French bid. The failure to win this 
bid led to much criticism of the French nuclear industry, in particular the lack of unity in the French 
bid. EDF, which has acted as architect engineer for all the PWRs built in France, had been unwilling 
to act as architect engineer for foreign bids and had only been persuaded by the French government in 
December to lead the bid as the UAE utility, ENEC, had requested.
31
 
USA 
The USA is potentially the largest nuclear market (along with China) in the world and Areva and EDF 
have made a major financial commitment to open up this market. EPR is one of five designs being 
assessed by the US safety authorities, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), and is a candidate 
for Federal subsidies including Federal loan guarantees. Subsidies for new nuclear reactors were first 
mooted in 2002, when President Bush launched an initiative aimed at re-starting commercial ordering 
for nuclear reactors using the Generation III+ design in the USA, the Nuclear Power 2010 
programme: no reactor order, not subsequently cancelled, had been placed since 1974 in the USA. 
The Bush government believed that nuclear technology was competitive and that a handful of 
subsidised demonstration plants were needed to show that the new designs had overcome the 
problems of earlier designs.
32
 The publicity for the programme claimed: ‗New Generation III+ designs 
... have the advantage of combining technology familiar to operators of current plants with vastly 
improved safety features and significant simplification is expected to result in lower and more 
predictable construction and operating costs.‘33 
This programme has evolved considerably since it was first announced and although nominally 
Nuclear Power 2010 is due to end at the end of fiscal year 2010, the effort by the Federal government 
to re-start nuclear reactor ordering will almost certainly continue. Nuclear Power 2010 originally had 
the goal of having new reactors online by 2010. Time-scales have slipped substantially – the first unit 
is unlikely to be on-line before about 2018 if there are no more delays. 
The programme was to take advantage of new licensing procedures, already passed into law in the 
1992 Energy Policy Act, so that a combined Construction and Operating License (COL) license 
would replace the existing procedure of separate construction and operating licenses. The proposed 
Energy Policy Act of 2003 (EPACT 2003) offered the prospect of Federal loan guarantees for new 
reactors covering up to 50 per cent of the cost of the projects. When the Congressional Budget Office 
(CBO)
34
 looked at the cost implications of this bill, it assumed that loan guarantees would be offered 
for six reactors. The CBO assumed that the reactors would be of 1100MW, each costing US$2.5bn 
(US$2300/kW) and that they would be financed by 50 per cent debt and 50 per cent equity. This 
meant that the guarantees required would be worth about US$7.5bn. It asserted the risk of default 
would be ‗well above 50 percent‘ but that over the plant‘s expected operating lifetime, its creditors 
(which could be the federal government) could expect to recover a significant portion of the plant‘s 
construction loan so the net cost to taxpayers would be about 25 per cent of the sum guaranteed. 
EPACT 2003 was not passed, but a successor bill, the Energy Policy Act of 2005 (EPACT 2005) was 
passed and contained much more generous levels of support for new nuclear reactors. EPACT 2005 
included provisions to cover cost overruns due to regulatory delays,
35
 and a production tax credit of 
1.8 cents per kilowatt-hour for the first 6,000 megawatt-hours from new nuclear reactors for the first 
eight years of their operation, subject to a $125 million annual limit.
36
 
However, the biggest incentive was the provision of loan guarantees under Title XVII of that bill. 
While the loan guarantees would only be available for technologies that were not ‗commercial‘, the 
number of units that would be eligible was not precisely specified. The US Department of Energy 
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stated: ‗DOE has defined ―commercial technologies,‖ which are not eligible for loan guarantees under 
this program, as ―in general use if it has been installed in and is being used in three or more 
commercial projects in the United States in the same general application as in the proposed project, 
and has been in operation in each such commercial project for a period of at least five years.‖ Given 
that new reactors will take at least five to ten years to build, a large amount of loan guarantees for the 
same design could be offered before the design is considered ―commercial‖.37 
The potential scale of the loan guarantees programme has escalated dramatically since 2003. Let us 
assume that these were now available for only three units of each of the five designs being assessed 
by the US NRC and for up to 80 per cent of the total cost. Since the CBO made its estimate in 2003, 
the estimated cost of new reactors has increased to at least US$6000/kW and their average size has 
increased to 1200-1600MW making the cost (without finance costs) of an EPR nearly US$10bn. 
Under these assumptions the programme would be able to provide loan guarantees worth more than 
US$100bn. In July 2008, the US DOE announced it was ready to accept applications for loan 
guarantees, but Congress authorized only up to US$18.5bn.
38
 Congress believed this might be 
sufficient to cover four projects (seven to eight reactors), but using more realistic cost assumptions, 
this seemed likely to be able to only allow three or four reactors at most. The Obama Administration 
asked for an additional US$36bn in loan guarantees in February 2010 , but the appropriations process 
was held up by election-year politics, so by November 2010, it was not clear how much the additional 
funds would be. There is also the issue of the fee that should be charged to borrowers for the loan 
guarantees. This should be an economic fee, in other words, one that reflects the risk involved. . The 
fees are assessed by the federal Office of Management and Budget and are supposed to reflect the risk 
of default for that project. As has become clear with the Calvert Cliffs project, discussed below, if the 
risk of a loan is assessed to be high, the fee could be more than the developers are prepared to pay. 
The subsidies on offer under EPACT 2005 did stimulate utilities to announce plans for more than 30 
new reactors, seven of which were for EPRs. However, a significant proportion of these never got 
beyond the early planning stage and by June 2010, only 27 had made applications to the NRC for 
COLs. Four of these were for EPRs (see Table 1) including two to be built by UniStar, a 50-50 joint 
venture created in 2005 between EDF and the US utility, Constellation. UniStar is a partner in the 
other two projects with PPL for the Bell Bend project and with Ameren UE for the Callaway reactor. 
By June 2010, of these 27 reactors, one application had been withdrawn and the owners of four 
others, two of which were for EPRs, had asked for the process to be suspended. Of the remaining 22, 
two were EPRs and the developer of one of these, PPL, stated that it was still ‗several years from a 
final decision on whether to build Bell Bend.‘39 The future of the EPR therefore seemed highly 
dependent on the one EPR project still being actively pursued, the UniStar Calvert Cliffs project. 
Table 1 EPR’s proposed in USA  
Plant  Owner  COL application  Loan Guarantee  
Calvert Cliffs 3  UniStar  COL 3/08  Shortlist  
Callaway 2  AmerenUE  Suspended 4/09  Applied  
Nine Mile Pt 3  UniStar  Suspended 1/09  Applied  
Bell Bend  PPL  COL 10/08  Applied  
Source: Author‘s research 
The presence of EDF in the UniStar joint venture, with its vast experience of building and operating 
PWRs supplied by Areva – 58 units in service in France – was seen as a major advantage. 
Constellation owns about 3.9GW of existing nuclear power plants at three sites (Calvert Cliffs, Nine 
Mile Point and Ginna).
40
 In September 2008, EDF tried to take over Constellation but were outbid by 
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MidAmerican Energy Holdings, a private company controlled by Warren Buffet. It was reported that 
the rival bid for Constellation could derail EDF‘s nuclear ambitions in the USA if MidAmerican did 
not support new nuclear build. In December 2008, EDF announced an agreement with Constellation 
to take a 49.99% holding in Constellation‘s nuclear subsidiary, Constellation Energy Nuclear Group. 
The deal was done through the EDF subsidiary, EDF Development Inc, and cost US$4.5bn.
41
 Mid 
American Holdings amicably withdrew its offer. The UniStar joint venture remains separate from this 
deal. 
Whether the purchase of the stake in Constellation‘s nuclear assets made any sense without the new 
build reactors is far from clear. However, it is apparent that EDF regards it as part of its bid to build 
new reactors and expand the scope of its operations into plant design and construction. Nucleonics 
Week reported: ―EDF Chairman/CEO Pierre Gadonneix defended the decision to buy what some in 
France are calling ‗old‘ US nuclear plants as a ticket to what will be ‗the world's largest nuclear 
market tomorrow‘.‖42 In summer 2009, Gadonneix was replaced by Henri Proglio, who has been 
reportedly much less enthusiastic about EDF‘s nuclear expansion outside France. 
The Calvert Cliffs reactor was forecast to cost US$7.2bn in 2008.
43
 UniStar ordered forgings and 
other long lead-time reactor components for Calvert Cliffs in 2006 and 2007. A partial construction 
and operating license application (COLA), mainly the environmental report, was submitted in July 
2007 and was docketed by the NRC in January 2008. The remainder of the COLA was submitted in 
March 2008 and was docketed on June 4, 2008. As of November 2010, there was no schedule for 
issue of the COL because of the problems with certifying the design.
44 Part 1 of the application for 
federal loan guarantees was submitted in September 2008 and Part 2 in December 2008. In 2009, the 
US Department of Energy short-listed four projects for loan guarantees, including Calvert Cliffs. The 
first loan guarantee was offered to another project in February 2010 and an offer to Calvert Cliffs was 
widely expected to follow soon after. However, by August 2010, no commitment had been made and 
Constellation began to cut back drastically on expenditure on the Calvert Cliffs project. How far this 
was due to the delays in granting loan guarantees and how far it was due to deterioration in the 
economics of the new reactor is not clear. 
The CEO of Constellation stated: ‗market signals to build a baseload plant of any kind, let alone 
nuclear, have suffered significantly since we started the project four years ago.‘ He said Constellation 
will abandon the project if it does not receive a conditional loan guarantee for the project. The poor 
market signals included low natural gas prices and the short- and long-term power price outlooks.
45
 
EDF, in its report for the first half of 2010 published in July 2010, made a provision of €1.06bn (about 
US$1.45bn) related to financing delays on nuclear projects in the United States.
46
 
By September, signs of strain between EDF and Constellation were clear. A particular issue was that 
under the terms of the purchase of the stake in Constellation‘s nuclear assets, Constellation could 
require EDF to US$2bn worth of Constellation‘s natural gas, coal and hydropower plants by end 
2010.
47
 There was speculation in September 2010 that these problems could lead to EDF selling its 
stake in the nuclear assets and dissolving the UniStar joint venture.
48
 In October 2010, Constellation 
unilaterally withdrew from negotiations with the US Department of Energy for loan guarantees for the 
Calvert Cliffs project. It was reported that the fee to provide loan guarantees for 80 per cent of the 
forecast cost of the plant (US$9.6bn) was initially proposed at US$880m, or 11.6 per cent of the 
amount borrowed.
49
 When Constellation rejected that offer, DOE proposed a 5 per cent fee, but with 
conditions including that Constellation fully guarantee construction and commit to sell 75 per cent of 
the power through a Purchase Power Agreement (PPA), presumably through its subsidiary Baltimore 
Gas & Electric. The Maryland Public Service Commission (PSC) would have had to approve a PPA.  
9 
 
Subsequently Constellation sold its 50 per cent stake in UniStar to EDF for US$140m. In addition, 
Constellation transferred to UniStar potential new nuclear sites at Nine Mile Point and R.E. Ginna in 
New York as well as Calvert Cliffs. The agreement requires EDF to transfer 3.5 million of the shares 
it owns in Constellation and to give up its seat on Constellation's board and in exchange, Constellation 
gave up the option to require EDF to buy Constellation‘s fossil fuel capacity.50 
EDF was reported to be keen to proceed with the Calvert Cliffs project but US law does not allow US 
nuclear reactors to be owned, controlled or dominated by foreign companies or governments, so EDF 
would need to find a new partner to proceed. It is not clear whether loan guarantees could be offered 
to UniStar in advance of a new US partner being agreed and whether the fee would be the same. 
While the political wrangling about how much Congress will be prepared to allow the US DOE to 
offer in loan guarantees, the deteriorating prospective economics for new nuclear reactors and the 
economic risk they pose to their owners may mean that relatively few loan guarantees are granted. 
The projects most likely to go ahead are those with the ‗belt and braces‘ of Federal loan guarantees 
and a state regulatory body that commits to allowing the utility to recover its costs from consumers. 
Calvert Cliffs and Bell Bend would be exposed to the PJM electricity market and therefore could 
expect no support from the state regulator. If the Calvert Cliffs project does collapse and an existing 
project, such as Bell Bend cannot be brought in to replace it, it is hard to see how the EPR could 
survive in the USA. This would be a severe blow to EDF and Areva, both of which have invested a 
large amount of cash and their credibility in opening up the US market to the EPR. 
Future prospects 
The EPR is competing in a number of other markets where Areva NP hopes it will be the basis for 
series ordering, in particular the UK and Italy. 
UK 
The UK government‘s program is based on very different underlying assumptions than that of the 
United States. The UK government did not claim that nuclear power would be directly competitive 
with fossil fuels, but if a carbon price of €36/tonne was assumed, it would be competitive. Both the 
Labour government up to May 2010 and the successor Conservative/Liberal Democrat coalition seem 
heavily committed to reviving nuclear ordering in the United Kingdom. However, all three parties 
have stated that orders should only be placed if they do not involve public subsidies. Ordering would 
therefore take place without subsidy, provided a few non-financial enabling decisions were taken, 
particularly on planning processes and certification of designs. In 2008, when the government 
revisited nuclear economics, it assumed the construction cost was £1,250/kW ($2,000/kW).  
The government‘s nuclear regulator, the Nuclear Installations Inspectorate of the Health and Safety 
Executive (HSE), started to examine four separate designs in 2007 including the Areva NP EPR and 
the Toshiba/Westinghouse AP1000. The rationale was that up to three designs would be finally 
certificated, thus giving utilities a choice of designs. In fact, the other two designs were quickly 
withdrawn leaving just the EPR and AP1000. 
Three utilities have made significant commitments to UK ordering: EDF, RWE, and E.ON – the latter 
two in a consortium called Horizon. EDF took over the UK nuclear generation company, British 
Energy, for about €15 billion in 2008, while RWE/E.ON have purchased sites in 2009 adjacent to 
existing nuclear power plants for several hundred million Euros. Both EDF and the RWE/E.ON 
consortium expect to order 4 units, for a total of 10 to 12 GW of capacity. EDF is expected to order 
the EPR, while the RWE/E.ON consortium has yet to choose its supplier. 
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EDF heavily committed itself to nuclear ordering in the United Kingdom with its purchase in 2009 of 
British Energy. The price seemed far above the value of the assets being acquired and only has any 
logic if new nuclear orders are placed. British Energy went bankrupt in 2002 because its operating 
costs, then about £16/MWh, were marginally higher than the price it received for electricity. Since 
then, operating costs have grown every year and by 2008/09, the operating costs had risen to 
£41.3/MWh. British Energy only remained solvent because of the extremely high wholesale 
electricity prices that prevailed in that period – British Energy received £47/MWh in that period. If 
operating costs continue to rise and/or wholesale electricity prices fall (by the end of 2009, they were 
well below the 2008 peak), British Energy will be at risk of collapse again.  
The RWE/E.ON consortium had invested a few hundred million pounds in options to buy sites, but if 
it did not take up these options, it could walk away from a British nuclear program at little cost. By 
the start of 2010, the UK was still 3-4 years from completing safety assessment of the design and 
getting planning permission for specific sites – the point when a firm order could be placed.  
Italy 
In 1987, a referendum led to the closure of the four operating nuclear power plants in Italy and the 
abandonment of work on construction of another nuclear station. The Berlusconi government has 
introduced legislation that would pave the way for the reintroduction of nuclear power in Italy. Four 
1650 MW EPRs could be built, with construction starting as early as 2013, under an agreement signed 
in February 2009 by the French utility, EDF, and the largest Italian utility, ENEL. ENEL has not 
selected the sites for these units yet. It has said the cost would be about €4-4.5 billion each or $3,600-
4,000/kW.
51
 There has been speculation about other competing bids to build nuclear power plants – 
for example, a consortium led by A2A, the Milan-based utility offering AP1000s – but these projects 
are much less advanced than those of ENEL.
52
 
India 
It has been reported that a memorandum of understanding (MOU), including the intention to build 
two EPRs, would be signed in February 2009 between Areva and the state-owned Nuclear Power 
Corporation of India Limited.
53
 Even if this MOU is signed, it is far from being a firm order and many 
MOUs come to nothing, for example, if financing cannot be arranged. 
Other markets 
President Sarkozy has announced that a second EPR in France will be ordered in 2011 for the Penly 
site. It is unlikely there will be scope for many further orders for France given that France already has 
more baseload electricity capacity than it can readily use and with plans to operate existing reactors 
for up to 60 years instead of the earlier expectations of 40 years, it will not be till after 2035 when the 
existing reactors begin to be retired. The Penly plant was to be built by EDF, which would have a 50 
per cent stake in it, with the other stakes being held by the other major French utility, GDF Suez (25 
per cent) and ENEL (the main Italian utility), E.ON (a large German utility and the oil company, 
Total, each with 8.33 per cent. However, in September 2010, GDF Suez, which was disappointed not 
to have been given the job of building the plant, announced their withdrawal from the project.
54
 There 
were reports that GDF Suez was hoping to lead construction of a reactor at another site, using the 
Areva ‗Atmea‘ design (see below).55 
The Finnish Parliament has voted to allow construction of two additional nuclear reactors by two 
different consortia. Both consortia have named the EPR as one of three or four options they might 
choose. It is far from certain whether these orders will be placed, and if they are, whether the EPR 
will be chosen, especially given the poor performance of the EPR at the Olkiluoto site. 
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In July 2010 in the Canadian province of New Brunswick, Areva, the New Brunswick government 
and New Brunswick Power announced that they would examine the feasibility of building a light-
water nuclear reactor in the province by 2020. However, in September 2010, the incoming Premier for 
the province announced the agreement would go on the back-burner.
56
 
Construction experience 
While utilities and governments will be interested in the theoretical attractions of new designs, it will 
be actual experience of building and operating these new designs that will be crucial in determining 
their success. By October 2010, no EPR was yet in service but four were under construction, one in 
Finland (Olkiluoto), one in France (Flamanville) and two in China (Taishan). 
Olkiluoto 
The Olkiluoto-3 reactor order of December 2003 was the first nuclear order in Western Europe and 
North America since the 1993 Civaux-2 order in France and the first order outside the Pacific Rim for 
a Generation III/III+ design. The Finnish electricity industry had been trying to get Parliamentary 
approval for a new nuclear unit since 1992. This was finally granted in 2002. The Olkiluoto-3 order 
was a huge boost for the nuclear industry in general and Areva NP in particular. Industry anticipated 
that, once complete, the plant would provide a demonstration and reference for other prospective 
buyers of the EPR.  
The contract price for Olkiluoto-3 was reported in 2004 to be €3bn for a 1600 MW reactor.57 
Subsequently, the price was reported to be €3.2bn58 or €3.3bn.59 Safety approval was given by the 
Finnish regulator, STUK, in March 2005 and substantive work on-site started in August 2005. At the 
time the contract was signed, the value was equivalent to about US$3.6-4.0bn (depending on the 
contract price) or about $2250-2475/kW (€1=US$1.2). This cost included financing and two reactor 
cores, so the cost per kW in overnight terms would have been somewhat lower, although given  the 
very low rate of interest charged (2.6%), finance costs would be low. 
Although the total cost was well above the nuclear industry‗s target of US$1000/kW of only a few 
years previously, it was still regarded by many critics as a ‗loss-leader‘. Areva NP had been trying to 
persuade either EDF or one of the German utilities to place an order for an EPR since the late 1990s
60
 
and there were fears that if an order for the EPR was not placed soon, AREVA NP would start to lose 
key staff
61
 and the design would become obsolete.
62
 Areva NP also needed a ‗shop window‘ for EPR 
technology and Olkiluoto-3 would serve as a reference plant for other orders. As an additional 
incentive and at the request of the customer, Areva NP offered the plant on ‗turnkey‘ or fixed price 
terms. It also took responsibility for the management of the site and for the architect engineering, not 
just the supply of the ‗nuclear island‘. This was not a role it was accustomed to. For the 58 PWRs 
Areva NP‘s predecessor, Framatome, had supplied for France, as well as for the foreign projects 
including those in China and South-Africa, it was EDF that had provided these services. 
The Olkiluoto project has gone seriously wrong since construction started. By August 2010, Areva 
NP acknowledged that the estimated cost had reached €5.7bn (an additional €367m was 
acknowledged in the 2009 accounts), which at the prevailing exchange rate of €1=US$1.35 
represented a cost of US$4800/kW.
63
 The contract is also the subject of an acrimonious dispute 
between Areva NP and the customer, Teollisuuden Voima Oy (TVO). Areva NP claims compensation 
of about €1bn for alleged failures of TVO. TVO, in a January 2009 counterclaim, is demanding 
€2.4bn in compensation from Areva NP for delays in the project.64  
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Table 2 Timetable of problems at Olkiluoto 3 
Date Event 
4/04 STUK: ‗We are getting the documents late.  They (Areva) aren‘t reserving enough time for our review 
and they don‘t have all the information required by our guides.‘65 
10/05 Pouring of base slab delayed by concerns about strength of concrete. Manufacturing of reactor 
pressure vessel and steam generators "a few weeks" behind the original schedule
66
 
2/06 Problems with qualifying pressure vessel welds and delays in detailed engineering design put 
construction more than six months behind schedule
67
 
3/06 STUK opened an investigation into manufacturing and construction problems
68
 
5/06 Despite measures including two shifts on site and three shifts at Areva's component manufacturing 
plant, work is eight to nine months behind schedule.
69
 
7/06 TVO acknowledges delay now 1 year. STUK investigation: An extremely tight budget and timetable, 
supplier inexperience, poor subcontractor control and regulators‘ difficulty in assessing information 
have caused confusion and quality control problems that have delayed the Olkiluoto-3 project
70
 
10/06 Areva takes provision of ca €300m for Olkiluoto project71 3 out of 4 ‗hot legs‘ not made to 
specification.
 72
 Project manager replaced 
73
 
12/06 Delay estimated at 18 months
74
 
1/07 Areva NP: Areva-Siemens cannot accept 100 % compensation responsibility, because the project is 
one of vast co-operation. The building site is joint so we absolutely deny 100 % compensation 
principle‘ TVO: ‗I don‘t believe that Areva says this. The site is in the contractor‘s hands at the 
moment. Of course, in the end, TVO is responsible of what happens at the site. But the realisation of 
the project is Areva‘s responsibility‘75 
5/07 TVO and Areva agree design not complete enough when contract signed. STUK: ‗a complete design 
would be the ideal. But I don't think there's a vendor in the world who would do that before knowing 
they would get a contract. That's real life.
76
 
8/07 Problems meeting requirements to withstand an airplane crash mean delay 2 years
77
 
9/07 Steel containment liner repaired in 12 places to fix deformations and weld problems
78
 Areva 
acknowledges further financial provisions for losses but does not quantify them. Independent estimate 
€500-700m79 
6/08 TVO site manager replaced
80
 
10/08 Delay  now estimated at 3 years
81
 Manufacturer of containment liner failed to obey an order to stop 
welding after a STUK-TVO inspection discovered that an incorrect welding procedure was being 
used
82
 Areva initiates arbitration proceedings in Arbitration Institute of the Stockholm Chamber of 
Commerce over ‗a technical issue‘83 
12/08 Areva announces further loss provisions. Independent estimates €1.3bn84 
12/08 Letter from STUK Director General top CEO Areva: ‗I cannot see real progress being made in the 
design of the control and protection systems.‘ ‗This would mean that the construction will come to a 
halt and it is not possible to start commissioning tests.‘ ‗the attitude or lack of professional knowledge 
of some persons who speak in the expert meetings on behalf of that organisation prevent to make 
progress in resolving the concerns‘85 
1/09 Delay acknowledged to be 3.5 years.
86
 Siemens announces withdrawal from Areva NP.
87
 Areva-
Siemens file a second arbitration proceeding against TVO.
88
 Areva asking for €1bn in compensation. 
TVO counterclaiming for  €2.4bn for ‗gross negligence‘89 TVO expects arbitration to take several 
years
90
 
3/09 Areva admits cost over-run now €1.7bn91 
06/10 TVO reports further delay till 2013 to completion of the plant.
92
 Delay confirmed by Areva NP
93
 
07/10 Areva booked €367m in new charges on expected losses with Olkiluoto.94 
Sources: As per endnotes 
It seems unlikely that all the problems that have contributed to the delays and cost-overruns have been 
solved (see Table 2); the final cost could be significantly higher. The result of the claim and counter-
claim arbitration between Areva NP and TVO will determine how the cost over-run will be 
apportioned. It is far from clear that TVO could survive financially if it had to shoulder a significant 
proportion of these costs. Even Areva, despite it being controlled by the French government had its 
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credit rating reduced to BBB+, partly because of these problems
95
 and it would hardly be good for 
business if its customer was put out of business by the purchase of an EPR. 
Flamanville 
EDF finally ordered an EPR reactor in January 2007, to be located at their Flamanville site. This 
reactor was rated at 1630 MW
96
 and construction commenced in December 2007.
97
 In May 2006, EDF 
estimated the cost would be €3.3bn.98 At that time (€1=US$1.28), this was equivalent to 
US$2590/kW. This cost however did not include the first fuel or finance costs, so the overnight cost, 
which conventionally includes fuel but not finance costs would have been somewhat higher.  
EDF did not seek a turnkey contract and chose to manage the contracting, for example, letting 
contracts for the turbine generator and the architect engineering. How far these decisions were 
influenced by the poor experience at Olkiluoto and how far they were influenced by the need EDF 
saw to maintain in-house skills is not clear. 
In May 2008, the French safety regulatory authorities temporarily halted construction at Flamanville 
because of quality issues in pouring the concrete base mat.
99
 Delays had led the vendor, Areva NP to 
forecast the reactor would not be completed until 2013, a year late, but in November 2008, EDF 
claimed the delays could be made up and the reactor finished by the original schedule of 2012.
100
 EDF 
did admit that the expected construction costs for Flamanville had increased from €3.3 billion to €4 
billion.
101
 This was then equivalent to US$3,265/kW (€1=US$1.33), substantially more than the 
Olkiluoto contract price, but far below the levels being quoted in the USA and the current cost of 
Olkiluoto. An Areva official suggested that the cost of an EPR will now be at least €4.5bn, although it 
was not specified whether this was an overnight cost.
102
 In January 2010, French unions reported that 
the project was then running at least two years behind schedule.
103
 These reports, originally denied by 
EDF, were confirmed by them in July 2010, when it also acknowledged that costs were by then 
running at €1.7bn over the original €3.3bn budget.104 In October 2010, Le Figaro reported a further 
delay of a year at Flamanville citing ‗several‘ sources. EDF have denied this report.105 
Table 3 Timetable of problems at Flamanville 3  
Date Event 
5/06 EDF decides to proceed with Flamanville 3
106
 
7/06 Site work commenced. Target construction time 54 months, construction cost €3.3bn excluding 
finance and fuel
107
 
108
 
1/07 NSSS ordered from Areva NP
109
 
4/07 French government issues construction license
110
 
12/07 First concrete poured
111
 
3/08 ASN asks EDF to improve work in several areas involving in particular quality control and 
organization
112
. Inspection had revealed several problems in the civil construction work, including 
errors in installation of steel reinforcing bar in the concrete and "inconsistency" between rebar 
blueprints and the concrete pouring plan. organization for preparing concrete pouring was 
"insufficient,"
113
 
5/08 ASN requires EDF to stop concrete pouring on May 26 (ban lifted June 17). Problems ‗show 
insufficient discipline on the part of the licensee and insufficient project organization‘. Welding 
anomalies found in one of the four bottom pieces of the steel liner of the containment building
 114
 
10/08 ASN told Areva to improve its oversight of forgings after procedures used by Italian subcontractor 
Societe della Fucine were found not to conform to standards.
115
 
12/08 EDF acknowledges cost had increased to €4bn due mainly to inflation, and technical & regulatory 
changes.
116
 Construction schedule claimed still to be achievable 
01/10 Unions claim construction is at least 2 years behind schedule.
117
  
07/10 EDF confirms delay and announces expected costs are €1.7bn over budget.118 
08/10 ASN asks EDF to modify the architecture of the non-safety instrumentation and control system.
119
 
14 
 
10/10 Le Figaro reports a further year delay
120
 
Sources: As per endnotes 
Note: ASN = Autorité de sûreté nucléaire 
Taishan 
Under the terms of the contract Areva NP won to supply two EPRs to China, the company is only 
supplying the nuclear island and the contract is not turnkey. EDF is involved in the management of 
this project and has an equity stake in the reactors.
121
 Little reliable, independent information comes 
out of China on nuclear construction. The IAEA reported that work started on the first Taishan unit in 
November 2009 and on the second unit in April 2010. In July 2010, the South China Morning Post 
reported that work on the ‗second phase‘ the Taishan units would not start in the third quarter of 2011 
as expected.
122
 No reason for the delay was given by the plant owners, but there has been speculation 
that China was not comfortable with the fact that delays at Olkiluoto and Flamanville meant that the 
Taishan units would probably be the first EPRs to enter service. 
Safety assessment 
As mentioned previously, there was some confusion about the level of assessment of the EPR that had 
been carried out by the Finnish and the French regulators when construction started at the Olkiluoto 
and Flamanville plants respectively. It is now clear that neither had carried out a comprehensive 
generic safety review. 
In August 2007, the UK safety regulator, the HSE launched its Generic Design Assessment (GDA) for 
the EPR (and three other designs). The timetable called for completion of the generic review in June 
2011. There are three possible conclusions to this process:
123
 (1) if the regulators are fully content, 
they will issue an HSE Design Acceptance Confirmation (DAC); (2) if they are largely content, they 
will issue an HSE Interim Design Acceptance Confirmation (DAC) or Environment Agency Interim 
Statement of Design Acceptability and identify the unresolved GDA Issues; and (3) if the regulators 
are not content no Design Acceptance Confirmation (DAC) or Statement of Design Acceptability will 
be issued. By August 2010, the HSE had acknowledged the first and third outcomes were 
implausible.
124
 In the case of the second outcome, the proposer would have to submit a Resolution 
Plan. However, once an interim DAC has been given, issues not covered by the Resolution Plan 
would not be considered. The HSE has recognised that it will probably be the first regulator to 
complete a generic assessment of the EPR and this would leave it in an invidious position if its 
requirements are seen as less stringent than those of other regulators. The HSE stated in July 2010:
125
 
‗We had originally hoped that the safety assessment of AP1000 and EPR by their ‗home‘ regulators would 
be complete well before we completed GDA Step 4 in June 2011 so that we could fully consider their 
conclusions during our own assessment. However, we now understand that there is significant ongoing 
safety assessment by the home regulators for both AP1000 and EPR. This is a significant regulatory process 
concern for us, the implications of which are being considered at present, together with ways of ensuring the 
best possible international cooperation on and harmonisation of assessment outcomes.‘ 
The HSE claims it will complete the GDA in June 2011, but ‗interim‘ approvals, which would not 
suffice for construction of the reactors to begin in the UK, appear at the moment to be ‗more likely‘ 
than final approvals for both designs for the June 2011 timeline.
126
  
Areva submitted a Standard Design Certification Application to the NRC in December 2007 more 
than 3 years after Areva NP began discussions with the NRC. At that time, Areva expected that the 
NRC would complete its technical review in two years, and finish the rulemaking that certifies the 
15 
 
design the following year, 2010.
127
 This proved over-optimistic and in March 2010, after a number of 
delays, the NRC stated the final certification would not be before June 2012.
128
 
Instrumentation and Control 
Table 2 shows that there were conflicts between Areva and STUK, the Finnish regulator even before 
construction started. The extent of these was illustrated by a leaked letter from the head of STUK, 
Jukka Laaksonen, to the CEO of Areva, Anne Lauvergeon in December 2008 (see Annex 1). In April 
2009, the HSE classified Instrumentation & Control (I&C) as a ‗Regulatory Issue‘, a particular feature 
of the design that might not meet UK regulatory standards.
129
 In July 2010, the I&C issue remained a 
Regulatory Issue and while HSE stated in July 2010 that it anticipated that an acceptable solution 
could be found, it had not received details of the modification proposed. The specific issue raised 
here, the level of redundancy in the I&C systems was subsequently taken up in a joint statement by 
the UK, French and Finnish regulators in November 2009.
130
 In August 2010, the HSE reported that 
while they believe that an ‗acceptable position can be reached for GDA‘, this would depend ‗on 
timely and quality responses from EDF and AREVA and we have already noted difficulties with 
delivery on other C&I issues.‘131 
The US and Chinese regulators were not party to this process, but in July 2010, it was reported that 
the US NRC had found that the I&C was too complex and interconnected to meet US regulations. The 
issue was described by an NRC spokesman as being ‗a critical path issue that is going to have to be 
resolved‘.132 Whether this resolution would delay completion of the review beyond June 2012 is not 
clear. However, the I&C systems for UK, France, Finland and the USA will now all differ from each 
other because it is too late to make some changes to the French and Finnish designs.
133
 
Core catchers 
A particular bone of contention has been the need of a ‗core-catcher‘. In the event of a failure of the 
emergency core cooling system, this would ‗catch‘ the core if it breached the reactor pressure vessel. 
There is no international agreement on the need for this feature: it is widely seen as essential for 
mainland Europe, but not the USA and other countries like Korea. However, this is an expensive 
system and Anne Lauvergeon blamed the extra cost of this as one of the factors behind the loss of the 
contract for UAE to a Korean design that does not have a core-catcher.
134
 Lauvergeon claimed that 
safety enhancements designed to prevent any offsite radiological impact — like the core catcher and 
the reinforced containment made the EPR 15 per cent more expensive than a Generation II PWR.
135
 
Economic issues 
When a ‗Nuclear Renaissance‘ was first mooted, a key element was the use of so-called Generation 
III+ designs, which would be safer, simpler, cheaper and easier to build than earlier designs. This, it 
was claimed, would overcome the problems that had led to the dramatic reduction in ordering from 
the mid-80s onwards. Particularly strong claims were made on costs with vendors claiming their new 
designs could be built for US$1000/kW. As noted above, cost was a particular issue from the start 
with the EPR and cost claims for it were not as aggressive as for some of the other designs. 
Nevertheless, in 1998, NPI claimed reactors could be built for US$1415/kW.
136
 In 2001, A US 
executive of Framatome claimed the EPR could be built in the USA for US$1320/kW.
137
 
In 2003, TVO‘s studies for Olkiluoto envisaged that it would be able to buy a nuclear reactor for 
US$1800/kW or less. EDF‘s studies from the same year assumed a cost of €1275/kW, then about 
US$1450,
138
 while the French government was even more optimistic in September of that year, 
assuming €1043/kW.139 These forecasts were revealed to be hopelessly unrealistic when it emerged 
that the winning bid for Olkiluoto was actually €3bn equivalent to €1875/kW or US$2300/kW. 
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In May 2006, when EDF ordered Flamanville, the cost estimated by EDF was reported to be €3.3bn, 
essentially the same as for Olkiluoto given inflation and the higher expected output (1630MW).
140
 
Costs at the Olkiluoto and Flamanville plants escalated rapidly, but it was not clear how far this was 
due to an underlying underestimate of costs and how far it was due to specific errors. Initial cost 
estimates for US EPRs were no less unrealistic with Areva and Unistar claiming overnight costs of 
US$1600-2000/kW in 2005.
141
 By 2008, Unistar was still estimating only US$2400/kW (2005 
dollars).
142
 However by August of that year, the Unistar CEO, Mayo Shattuck suggested that the cost 
would be at the mid- to upper-end of the range US$4500-6000/kW (US$7.2-9.6bn).
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Reports of bids for international contests produced even higher projected costs. In South Africa, 
Eskom expected a construction cost of US$2,500/kW. In January 2008, Eskom received two bids in 
reply to its call for tenders from November of the previous year for 3200 to 3400 MW of new nuclear 
capacity in the near term and up to 20,000 MW by 2025. One bid was from Areva for two EPRs (plus 
10 more for the long-term) and the other from Westinghouse for the three AP1000s (plus 17 more in 
the long term).
144
 Both claimed their bids were ―turnkey,‖ but whether they were really turnkey in the 
fixed price sense or whether they were simply for the whole plant is not clear. It was later reported 
that the bids were for around $6,000/kW – more than double the expected price.145 
In 2007, Ontario Power Authority (OPA), the public body responsible for planning the Ontario power 
system, had assumed nuclear power plants could be built for about C$2,900/kW.
146
  In June 2008, the 
Canadian government announced Darlington in Ontario as the site for a two-unit new build project 
and on May 20, 2009, information leaked that the Ontario government had chosen AECL as the 
leading bidder over Areva and Westinghouse to start building the first new nuclear plants in Canada 
in 25 years. Two new reactors were projected to start operating by 2018. However, the provincial 
government reportedly conditioned any go-ahead on financial guarantees by the federal government 
to cover the financial risks involved. Three bids were received, one from Areva and one from AECL, 
although only the AECL bid complied with the requirement that the vendor assume the construction 
risk. There was a press report on the size of the bids. This suggested that Areva‘s non-compliant bid 
was C$23.6 billion (US$21 billion) for two EPRs (1600 MW each) or C$7,375/kW (US$6,600/kW). 
AECL and Westinghouse‘s bids were higher. Ontario decided to suspend the tender. Subsequently, 
Areva disputed the published bid price, but they were not willing to supply the actual price they bid. 
In December 2009, the UAE ordered four nuclear reactors from Korea using AP1400 technology, 
beating opposition from consortia led by EDF (including GDF Suez, Areva, and Total with the EPR) 
and GE-Hitachi.
147
 The contract is with Korean Electric to build and operate the reactors, the first 
coming on-line at an unspecified site in 2017 and the last by 2020. The terms of the deal and what is 
included are not clear, although the contract is reported to be worth $20.4 billion. The Korean bid was 
reported to be $16 billion lower than the French bid.
148
 
The response from Areva to this failure was particularly vitriolic. The CEO , Anne Lauvergeon, 
blamed the extra safety features required by the European market, particularly the core-catcher and a 
steel-lined double concrete containment that the EPR includes, whereas the winning bid, the Korean 
APR-1400 has no core-catcher and a single steel containment structure. She seemed to propose that 
Areva could offer previous generation models (for example, the 1000MW design sold to China in 
1980) for export to third world countries.
149
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The Roussely Report 
The French government belatedly realised that commercialisation of the EPR was going badly and in 
October 2009 commissioned a former CEO of EDF, Francois Roussely, to examine the French 
nuclear industry. His report was given added point by the failure to win the tender for the UAE in 
December 2009. This failure was widely seen in France as due to the lack of an integrated offer 
including engineering, construction, fuel and waste, as well as equipment supply. The report, ‗The 
Future of the French Civilian Nuclear Sector‘ was published in July 2010.150 
Roussely identified two major problems: 
 The credibility of the EPR had been seriously damaged by problems at Olkiluoto and 
Flamanville; 
 The capacity factors [reliability] of reactors in France have deteriorated sharply whereas 
elsewhere in the world, these have improved significantly. 
He makes 15 recommendations, 12 described as ‗structural‘ and 3 as ‗emergency‘. Most of the 
structural measures seem to be aimed at creating a ‗Team France‘, which would ensure France could 
offer a unified and comprehensive package for export markets in emerging countries. He recommends 
that the extension of reactor operating life to 60 years is supported and that further optimisation of the 
EPR from the feedback of the four reactors under construction and of past achievements be carried 
out. This optimisation should be carried out jointly by EDF and Areva.  
On the problems at Olkiluoto and Flamanville, he recommends only that these reactors be completed 
with a few delays and as little cost over-run as possible. Lessons from this should be fed back into the 
construction of the Penly unit and any units ordered for the UK. The issue of poor reliability does not 
appear to be addressed directly by any of the recommendations. He does recommend that a charter 
setting out the conditions of employment applicable to all employees of nuclear power in France be 
introduced and that the mission of the Agence Securité Nucleaire (ASN) be reviewed, but it is not 
clear how this would address the issue of poor availability.  
Of most interest is his diagnosis of the problems with the EPR. He attributes the problems squarely to 
‗complexity‘: 
‗The complexity of the EPR comes from design choices, notably of the power level, containment, core 
catcher and redundancy of systems. It is certainly a handicap for its construction, and its cost. These 
elements can partly explain the difficulties encountered in Finland or Flamanville.‘ 
He recommends: 
‗The EPR should therefore be further optimised based on feedback from reactors under construction and past 
achievements. This optimisation would be lead jointly by EDF and Areva, in conjunction with ASN, with a 
view to make the detailed design as safe [as the current design].‘ 
This recommendation does not seem realistic. The EPR was designed over a long period with the 
specific objective of rationalising the features of earlier designs. To assume that it would be a simple 
and quick process to just go through the design again to simplify it seems totally unrealistic. This is 
well illustrated by the issue of the I&C system noted above, which, ironically, was seen as not having 
enough redundancy. This problem was first identified in 2008; yet more than two years later, a 
detailed solution to the problem still has not been presented to the regulators. Any redesign that was 
comprehensive enough to significantly reduce complexity and costs would almost certainly be so 
extensive as to require the regulators to make a very full re-evaluation of the design. 
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This was the case with the problems with the AP1000 in the USA. This design received generic 
approval from the US regulator in 2006; yet in 2008, the supplier, Toshiba/Westinghouse, put in 
extensive design revisions that the US regulator is not expected to be able to approve before 2012. If 
we assume that this process of rationalization could be done in two years starting in 2011 and the 
regulators took a further four years to assess the design, this would mean that the design would not be 
ready to order before about 2017/18, after the Penly unit in France is expected to be on-line and at 
about the same time as EDF is claiming it will have the first UK EPR on-line.  
Roussely recommends that the international French nuclear offering be ‗diversified‘  with a smaller 
design, the Atmea, that could be brought to market quickly as a design more suitable for markets that 
would struggle to accommodate a reactor as large as the EPR. The Areva-Mitsubishi joint venture to 
develop Atmea was first announced in 2007.
151
 Atmea was described as being Generation III (rather 
than III+). A company spokesman said Atmea would be based on ‗proven technologies‘ with ‗no 
technical breakthroughs or revolutionary innovations‘. The design was reportedly to be submitted to 
the French regulator, ASN, in June 2010.
152
 The target for ASN to complete its review by fall 2011 
seems unrealistic. Designs of this size from Areva or Mitsubishi are now more than 30 years old and 
given new features such as a core catcher and aircraft crash protection, the design must be 
substantially new. This either suggests that a highly optimistic timetable has been adopted or that the 
ASN review will not be a full generic assessment. Realistically, the Atmea design is highly unlikely to 
be available to order for 4-5 years and it is far from clear who the customers might be. GDF-Suez has 
expressed interest in building one in France but given that France already has serious over-capacity in 
nuclear, this would make no sense. Other customers, such as Jordan, are still some way from placing 
an order and for a country with no nuclear experience to order a first-of-a-kind unproven design 
would be seen as a massive risk. 
It is particularly interesting to note the things that Roussely is entirely silent on. He fails to mention 
the prohibitively high prices bid by Areva on Ontario and South Africa, about double what the 
relevant governments expected. He also says a great deal about the Atmea design but nothing about 
the Kerena design, a BWR design that Areva has been working on for about as long as it has been 
working on the Atmea. The Kerena design is one of the options if another nuclear reactor is built in 
Finland. 
The question that Roussely should have but utterly fails to address is whether the EPR is salvageable. 
Given the difficulties at construction sites, dramatically soaring construction cost estimates and 
difficulties of getting generic safety approval, this is surely the question that begs to be asked. It may 
be that the consequences to France‘s nuclear strategy if the answer is that it is not are so severe that 
the question is politically impossible for an inquiry commissioned by the French government. 
The fallout from the Roussely report seems set to continue with efforts by the French government to 
create a ‗Team France‘ and the two key companies, EDF and Areva jockeying for position. It was 
reported in September that EDF was being pressed to increase its direct stake in Areva from 2.4 per 
cent to 15 per cent.
153
 EDF was making clear its dissatisfaction with Areva. It was reported in 
September 2010 that EDF was contemplating a partnership with a Chinese nuclear vendor or a 
Russian nuclear vendor to offer their designs to South Africa
154
 and that EDF was planning to develop 
nuclear reactors of its own design in competition with Areva.
155
 Neither proposal seems realistic: the 
Chinese design is essentially a 1970s design imported from France, which in turn imported it from the 
USA; the history of the EPR suggests that the time taken from start of conceptual design to the point 
when the reactor could be ordered is likely to be in the order 10-15 years.  A more likely explanation 
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is that EDF is trying to ensure that in any new configuration for the French nuclear industry, it is very 
much in the lead. 
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Conclusions 
The EPR design is in crisis.  
 Construction has gone dramatically wrong at the two sites in Europe where it is being built; 
 The prices it is being offered at are so high that all contests where the EPR has been bid have 
either been abandoned (South Africa and Canada) or the contract has gone to a much lower 
bid from a competitor (UAE); 
 Potential markets such as USA, UK and Italy all look problematic and reactor orders, if 
placed at all, will be much later than expected 
 The process of obtaining safety approval in France, UK and USA is incomplete and, even if 
successful, the features needed to achieve regulatory approval may add significantly to costs. 
The two sites in Europe where EPR is under construction, Olkiluoto and Flamanville, have gone 
dramatically wrong from the start of construction. It might have been argued that the problems at 
Olkiluoto were due to the lack of experience of the utility and the inexperience of Areva NP in 
carrying out the architect engineering. However, the fact that EDF, the most experienced nuclear 
utility in the world seems to be doing no better at Flamanville suggests the main problems are more 
related to the buildability of the design itself than to specific issues at Olkiluoto.  
The promise for Generation III+ plants that they would: ‗have the advantage of combining technology 
familiar to operators of current plants with vastly improved safety features and significant 
simplification is expected to result in lower and more predictable construction and operating costs‘156 
has clearly not been fulfilled. The Chief Executive of Areva, Anne Lauvergeon, acknowledges: ‗the 
cost of nuclear reactors has "always" gone up with each generation, because the safety requirements 
are ever higher. "Safety has a cost,"‘157. Francois Roussely, former CEO of EDF stated: ‗The resulting 
complexity of the EPR, arising from the choice of design, specifically the level of power, the 
containment, the core catcher and the redundancy of the security systems is certainly a handicap for 
its construction and therefore its cost.‘158 
The intuitively plausible notion that a new generation of nuclear reactors, starting without a blank 
sheet of paper could easily come up with a more rational and cheaper, yet safer design of reactor has 
been shown to be an illusion by the lengthy and still incomplete process of gaining safety approval. 
The Finnish and French authorities‘ decision to allow construction to start before full generic approval 
had been given looks particularly ill-judged 
As early as 1995 and again in 1997, there were concerns about the cost of the EPR then expected to be 
US$2000/kW but when other vendors began to claim they could build plants for US$1000/kW, 
Framatome seems to have felt obliged to follow suit. While it did not claim US$1000/kW was 
possible, it did claim reactors could be built for less than US$1500/kW in 1998 and 2001, less than a 
quarter of the prices it is now offering a decade later. At US$6000/kW or more, it seems unlikely that 
EPR will be affordable except where huge public subsidies are offered and/or there is a strong 
likelihood of full cost recovery from consumers, no matter what the cost is. 
As the reality of these high costs hits home, it is likely that even markets in which government support 
for new nuclear orders has been strongest, such as the USA and UK, will find it difficult to support 
the costs. 
21 
 
From a business point of view, the right course for EDF and Areva seems clear. They must cut their 
losses and abandon the EPR now. In the short-term this will require some painful write-offs, for 
example, of investments in the UK and the USA, but in the long-term, the losses will be much greater 
if they continue to try to make the EPR work. Areva‘s main business is its reactor servicing and fuel 
activities and these would be little affected by the abandonment of the EPR. EDF already has too 
much nuclear generating capacity in France, so not ordering more reactors will save it from 
unnecessary capital expenditure at a time when it acknowledges its debts are too high.
159
 
However, from a political point of view, France has invested so much political and financial capital in 
being the world leader in nuclear technology, such a decision to abandon the design will be politically 
too painful until it becomes unavoidable. However, for the governments of countries like the USA and 
the UK, which have invested little political capital in the French nuclear dream, the sensible course is 
clear: stop all investment of public money in the doomed EPR technology. 
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Annex 1  Letter from Jukka Laaksonen to Anne Lauvergeon  
December 9, 2008 
Dear Mrs. Lauvergeon, 
 
With this letter I want to express my great concern on the lack of progress in the design of Olkiluoto 3 
NPP automation.  
 
The construction of Olkiluoto 3 plant seems to proceed generally well but I cannot see real progress 
being made in the design of the control and protection systems. Without a proper design that meets 
the basic principles of nuclear safety, and is consistently and transparently derived from the concept 
presented as an annex to the construction license application, I see no possibility to approve these 
important systems for installation. This would mean that the construction will come to a halt and it is 
not possible to start commissioning tests. 
 
I expressed my concern on this already in spring 2008, in a meeting with Mr. Xavier Jacob and TVO's 
management. After that Areva organised a workshop at professional level in Erlangen on April 23-25, 
2008. The goal of the workshop was to clarify the open technical issues. I was told afterwards that it 
was a successful event where our concerns were conveyed to your experts and were well understood 
by them. It was especially encouraging to hear that after the workshop a group led by an expert of 
high repute, Dr. Graf, was given a task to make sure that the issues be addressed promptly. 
 
Since then there have been several meetings among our experts but we have not seen expected 
progress in the work on Areva side. The systems with highest safety importance are to be designed by 
Areva NP SAS but unfortunately the attitude or lack of professional knowledge of some persons who 
speak in the expert meetings on behalf of that organisation prevent to make progress in resolving the 
concerns. Therefore, evident design errors are not corrected and we are not receiving design 
documentation with adequate information and verifiable design requirements. This is unfortunate 
because I am convinced that within your organisation there is enough competence to resolve all open 
issues. I wonder how this competence is actually being used in this project and whether an input by 
Dr. Graf and his group has been actually utilised. 
 
I sincerely hope you could initiate some action in this area, in order to ensure bringing the 
construction of Olkiluoto 3 to a successful end. 
 
With my best regards, 
 
Jukka Laaksonen 
Director General, STUK
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